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Mekel: Mekel: Hobson's Choice:

A Hobson's Choice:
Ensuring Open Government or
Conserving Government Funds
Hem eyer v. KRCG-TV

I. IMODUCTION
Part and parcel of American democracy is the notion that governmental
functions should be carried out in a manner that is open to public scrutiny and
accessible to the people. Capturing this belief, sunshine laws and freedom of
information statutes requiring public access to government meetings and records
began to emerge as early as 1898.2 Following the 1966 passage of the Federal
Freedom of Information Act,3 states that lacked such provisions adopted open
records and open meetings laws.4 Currently, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have statutory provisions that allow public access to official records
and meetings.5 However, these provisions vary widely from state to state. 6
Despite the diversity, more than half of the states, including Missouri, and the
District of Columbia have enacted overarching statements of public policy that
stress the importance of openness and accessibility as part of their open records
and open meetings laws

1. 6 S.W.3d 880 (Mo. 1999).
2. See Meri K Christensen, Note, Opening the Doors to Access: A Proposalfor
Enforcement of Georgia'sOpen Meetings and Open Records Laws, 15 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1075, 1075 (1999).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (amended 1996).
4. See Roger A. Nowadzky, A ComparativeAnalysis ofPublic Records Statutes,
28 URE. LAw. 65, 65 (1996).
5. See Charles N. Davis et al., Sunshine Lms andJudicialDiscretion: A Proposal
for Reform ofState Sunshine Law Enforcement Provisions,28 URB. LAW. 41, 42 (1996);
see also Student Press Law Center, What Every Student JournalistShould Know: Open
Meetings, Records, Campus Crime Specifics, Sept. 1997, at 44, available at
http'/spj.org/foialstudents/sjmain3.htm [hereinafter Student Journalist].
6. See Student Journalist,supranote 5, at 44-45.
7. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6250 (Vest 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-201, 24-

72-301(2) (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10001 (1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1521
(1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01 (West 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 92-1, 92F-2 (1993);
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/1 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-1 (Michie 1997);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-216 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 (West 1989);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.231 (West Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-61-1 to
25-61-2 (1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.011 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:1
(1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-5 (Michic
1995); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1(b) (1999);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.51, § 24A.2 (West 2000); RI. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-1 (Supp. 2000);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-15 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.001
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In Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, a case that arose when the Cole County Sheriff
filed suit seeking a judicial determination supporting closure of a videotape of
a legislator's booking on drunk driving charges, the Missouri Supreme Court
reiterated the public policy statement of openness that is part of the state's
Sunshine Law.8 To give broad effect to the policy of openness, as prescribed in
the Sunshine Law, the court interpreted a component of the Sunshine Law's
remedial provision,9 Missouri Revised Statutes Section 610.027.5 ("Subsection

(Vernon 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-102 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,§ 315
(1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-340.1 (Michie Supp. 2000); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
42.17.010, 42.17.251 (West 2000); W. VA. CODEANN. § 29B-1-1 (Michie 1998).
8. See Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, 6 S.W.3d 880, 881 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §
610.011.1 (1994)) (opening its analysis with the statement that "[a]ll public records shall
be open to the public").
9. The remedial provision of Missouri's Sunshine Law is contained in Missouri
Revised Statutes Section 610.027, which reads in its entirety as follows:
1. The remedies provided by this section against public governmental bodies
shall be in addition to those provided by any other provision of law. Any
aggrieved person, taxpayer to, or citizen of, this state, or the attorney general
or prosecuting attorney, may seek judicial enforcement of the requirements
of sections 610.010 to 610.026. Suits to enforce sections 610.010 to 610.026
shall be brought in the circuit court for the county in which the public
governmental body has its principal place of business.
2. Once a party seekingjudicial enforcement of sections 610.010 to 610.026
demonstrates to the court that the body in question is subject to the
requirements of sections 610.010 to 610.026 and has held a closed meeting,
record or vote, the burden of persuasion shall be on the body and its members
to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of sections 610.010 to
610.026.
3. Upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a public
governmental body or a member of a public governmental body has purposely
violated sections 610.010 to 610.027, the public governmental body or the
member shall be subject to a civil fine in the amount of not more than five
hundred dollars and the court may order the payment by such body or
member of all costs and reasonable attorney fees to any party successfully
establishing a violation of sections 610.010 to 610.026.
4. Upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a public
governmental body has violated any provision of sections 610.010 to
610.026, a court shall void any action taken in violation of sections 6 10.010
to 610.026, if the court finds under the facts of the particular case that the
public interest in the enforcement of the policy of sections 610.010 to 610.026
outweighs the public interest in sustaining the validity of the action taken in
the closed meeting, record or vote. Suit for enforcement must be brought
within one year from which the violation is ascertainable and in no event shall
it be brought later than two years after the violation. This subsection shall not
apply to an action taken regarding the issuance of bonds or other evidence of
indebtedness of a public governmental body if a public hearing, election or
public sale has been held regarding the bonds or evidence of indebtedness.
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5"), liberally against the Cole County Sheriff." As a result of its liberal
construction of Subsection 5, the court held that the sheriff was required to pay
the television station's suit-related attorney fees." In so holding, the court
provided a booster for the public policy of openness that underlies Missouri's
Sunshine Law 2 by eliminating the possibility that a governmental agency will
employ its resources to force an economically weaker record seeker to forego his
or her right of access to public records due to the costs associated with being
forced to defend in court.
This Note supports the analysis of and the decision reached by the Missouri
Supreme Court in Hemeyer. Both are consistent with the public policy of
openness explicitly provided in the state's Sunshine Lav,' 3 as well as in other
Missouri record-related statutes that were in effect at the time of the decision. 4
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On the evening of April 25, 1997, the Cole County Sheriff's Department
arrested State Representative Mark Richardson of Poplar Bluff and charged him
with driving while intoxicated."5 Security cameras installed in the booking area
of the Cole County Jail recorded a portion of Representative Richardson's
booking as part of the normal operation of the jail's videotaping security

5. A public governmental body which is in doubt about the legality of closing
a particular meeting, record or vote may bring suit at the expense of that
public governmental body in the circuit court of the county of the public
governmental body's principal place of business to ascertain the propriety of
any such action, or seek a formal opinion of the attorney general or an
attorney for the governmental body.

Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.027 (2000).
10. See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 882. For the text of Subsection 5, see supra note 9.
11. See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 882 (adopting the reasoning of City ofSpringfield
v. Events PublishingCo., 951 S.W.2d 366, 373-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) and State ex rel.
MissouriLocal Government Retirement Sstem v. Bill, 935 S.AV.2d 659, 665-66 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996)); infranotes 91-103 and accompanying text.
12. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.011.1 (2000).
13. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 32.091 (Supp. 1997), repealedby H.B. No. 1797, 90th
Gen. Assem. (Mo. 2000); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 610.011, .022.5 (2000).
14. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 109.180, 374.070 (2000).
15. See Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, No. VD 54950, 1999 VL 118287, at *1 (Mo. Ct.
App. Mar. 9, 1999), vacated,6 S.W.3d 880 (Mo. 1999); Police Videotapes ofBookings
Are Public Records, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAN,/, Winter 2000, at 9. Representative
Richardson was House Minority Leader at the time of the arrest. See Video ofD9f
Booking Is Ruled Public Record, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 8, 1999, at B2. In
addition, he had his daughter with him at the time of the incident and "eventually pleaded
guilty to misdemeanor counts of first-offense driving while intoxicated and child
endangerment." Id.
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system.' 6 Installed to monitor activities for the benefit of staff and prisoners, this
system sequentially taped on a rotational basis among twenty-eight video
cameras located throughout the facility.'7 In the course of its usual operation, the
system used six tapes per day.'8 The jail maintained a bank of numbered tapes
specifically for use in the videotaping system, and the tapes were sequentially
rotated, which resulted in each tape being "reused approximately every four and
one-half days."' 9
Aware of the Cole County Jail's videotaping system, KRCG-TV, a local
television station, directed a written request to Cole County Prosecuting
Attorney Richard Callahan two days after Richardson's arrest.2" In its letter, the
television station requested all documentation related to the representative's
drunk driving arrest, including "'a copy of the booking tape,"' for use in a news
story.2'
In response to KRCG-TV's request, Cole County Sheriff John Hemeyer
invoked Subsection 5 of the Sunshine Law's remedial provision and filed a
petition for declaratory judgment with the Cole County Circuit Court in
Jefferson City on May 1, 1997.23 Hemeyer's petition sought to determine
"whether any portion of the videotape constituted a public record" pursuant to
Chapter 610 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.24 Ruling in favor of Hemeyer, the
circuit court held that the videotape that included the representative's booking
did not constitute a public record because it was not prepared in relation to
official governmental business and because it was not a retained law
enforcement record as the tapes were routinely reused. 25 Therefore, the circuit
court held "that the tape was not subject to the disclosure requirements of
Chapter 610."26
KRCG-TV appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District of Missouri 7 which concurred with the circuit court's holding but
remanded the case for further proceedings in order for the circuit court to "make
findings and enter an award of attorney[] fees" for the television station pursuant
to Subsection 5 of the Sunshine Law's remedial provision. 28 However, prior to

16. See Hemeyer, 1999 WL 118287, at *1.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. For the text of Subsection 5, see supranote 9.
23. See Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, No. WD 54950, 1991 WL 118287, at *1 (Mo. Ct.
App. Mar. 9, 1999), vacated, 6 S.W.3d 880 (Mo. 1999).
24. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 82-84.
25. See Hemeyer, 1999 WL 118287, at *1.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *6.
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reconsideration of the case by the circuit court, the Missouri Supreme Court
vacated the court of appeals' decision and granted transfer."
On the issue of the public record status of the videotape, KRCG-TV argued
that because the booking video constituted a public record in accordance with
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 610.010(6),3 which defines public records for
the purposes of the Sunshine Law, it should be open for public inspection and
duplication pursuant to Section 610.011?1 KRCG-TV's argument was based on
the parties' stipulation that the sheriff is a public governmental body, the
sheriff's possession of the videotape at the time of the request for access, and the
fact that the sheriff did not invoke any of the open record exemptions provided
in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 610.021?2 The sheriff counterargued that
the tape did not qualify as a public record pursuant to the definitions of "record"
in Chapters 109 and 610 of the Missouri Revised Statutes because it was not
created in relation to official business and because the tapes were regularly
reused, rather than retained.33
With regard to the issue of attorney fees, KRCG-TV asserted that because
the sheriff brought the suit under Subsection 5 of the Sunshine Law's remedial
provision, the television station was entitled to recoup its expenses, including
attorney fees. In counterargument, the sheriff claimed that KRCG-TV should
not be awarded attorney fees because KRCG-TV did not present evidence on
attorney fees at the trial court and because the sheriff did not purposely violate
the Sunshine Law, as required by Missouri Revised Statutes Section 610.027.3
("Subsection 3 ").s
The Missouri Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision, unanimously
holding that the videotape, which normally would have been "retained for fourand-a-half days," was a public record in accordance vith Chapter 610 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes.36 The court's reasoning hinged on use of the term
"record" in Chapter 610, rather than Chapter 109, and the liberal construction

29. See Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, 6 S.W.3d 880, 881 (Mo. 1999).
30. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.010(6) (2000); see infratext accompanying note 82.
31. See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 881; Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.011.1 (2000).
32. See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 881; Appellant's Substitute Brief at 10-16, Hemeyer
(No. SC 81610). For the exemptions provided in Missouri Revised Statutes Section
610.021, see infra note 85.
33. See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 881-83; Respondent's Substitute Brief at 7-10,
Hemeyer (No. SC 81610). For the definition of "record" pursuant to Chapters 109 and
610 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, see itfra text accompanying notes 63, 82-84.
34. See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 882-83. Subsection 5 of the Sunshine Law's
remedial provision does not specifically mention attorney fees-rather it states that: "[a]
public governmental body... may bring suit at the expense of that public governmental
body." Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.027.5 (2000).
35. See Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, 6 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Mo. 1999). For the text of
Subsection 3, see supranote 9.
36. Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 882.
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requirement found in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 610.011.1, which states
that in order "'to promote [the] public policy"' of Missouri "'records... of
public governmental bodies be open to the public unless otherwise provided by
law."' 37 Furthermore, in a four-to-three decision, the court held that a liberal
construction of Subsection 5 was required to maintain the public policies
underlying Chapter 610 and that such a liberal construction provided for an
award of attorney fees to the record requestor through the statute's
language-suit "'at the expense of that public governmental body."' 3
IH. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. General Overview ofMissouri's Open Records Laws
In 1973, the Missouri General Assembly first enacted the Missouri
Sunshine Law,39 which applies to both open meetings and open records.4" The
law has been amended on numerous occasions during the twenty-seven years
ensuing its original enactment.4 Through one such amendment in 1987, the
legislature added a policy statement42 that expressly declared Missouri's
dedication to the openness of government. 3 This provision, Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 610.011.1, reads, in part: "[ilt is the public policy of this state
that meetings, records, votes, actions, and deliberations of public governmental
bodies be open to the public unless otherwise provided by law."'
Missouri courts have had numerous opportunities to interpret and apply this
statutory policy statement. In so doing, the courts generally have deferred to the
intent of the General Assembly through statements in dicta, such as: "[t]he open
meetings and records law recognizes that the public has an interest in seeing how
its government operates";45 "[the] Missouri law properly recognizes the public

37. Id.

38. Id. at 883; see infra text accompanying notes 93-103.
39. See 20 ALFRED S. NEELY, MISSOURI PRACTICE: ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE §§ 14.01-.03, 15.01 (2d ed. 1995); see also Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 610.010-.200
(2000).

40. See NEELY, supra note 39, at §§ 14.01, 15.01.
41. See NEELY, supra note 39, at §§ 14.01, 15.01.

42. See NEELY, supra note 39, at §§ 14.01-.03, 15.01.
43. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.011.1 (2000). See generally OFFICE OF STATE
AUDITOR CLAIRE
REQUIREMENTS,

MCCASKILL,

AUDIT

No.

OF COMPLIANCE WITH

99-104

SUNSHINE

LAW

available
at
http://www.auditor.state.mo.us/press/99-104.htm [hereinafter MCCASKILL]; Mo. ATr'Y
REPORT

(1999),

GEN., MO. SUNSHINE LAW, at http://www.ago.state.mo.us/sunintro.htm (last modified
Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter SUNSHINE LAW].
44. MO. REv. STAT. § 610.011.1 (2000). See generally SUNSHINE LAW, supra note

43.
45. State ex rel. Mo. Local Gov't Ret. Sys. v. Bill, 935 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Mo. Ct.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/5

6

Mekel: Mekel: Hobson's Choice:
2001]

MISSOURI'S OPENRECORDS LAW

interest in an open government"; and "[the] law reflects Missouri's
commitment to openness in government. ' 7 The courts have done so even when
giving effect to the strong policy towards openness produced a less-thanpalatable result.' Even before the amendment containing the express policy
statement was added, Missouri courts were proponents of the underlying
doctrine of open government,49 which was subsequently incorporated through the
express policy statement in the 1987 amendment 5
In addition to expressing the statute's overarching policy that governmental
activities should be conducted "in a manner that is open to public scrutiny,"' the
General Assembly established a presumption in favor of openness through
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 610.011.15
The General Assembly
accomplished this by "indicat[ing] how it desires the judiciary to approach the
statute-in a spirit of liberal construction where it demands openness and a spirit
of strict construction where it permits nondisclosure."-n To this end, Section
610.011.1 provides that the state's Sunshine Law "shall be liberally construed

App. 1996).
46. Librach v. Coopers, 778 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
47. Kan. City Star Co. v. Shields, 771 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
48. See N. Kan. City Hosp. Bd. of Trs. v. St. Luke's Northland Hosp., 984 S.W.2d
113, 122 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). The court stated, in dicta, that:
[W]hile we reach this conclusion [that the requested records must be released
as they are public records] based on the provisions of the Sunshine Law, we
do so with a firm conviction that the Legislature neither contemplated nor
intended that private health care providers would use the law to gain
competitive advantage over much needed public institutions . . . [as]

[w]idespread use of the law for this purpose could have a devastating impact
on public health care facilities throughout the state.
Id.
49. See Cohen v. Poelker, 520 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Mo. 1975). The court stated, in
dicta, that:
The several sections of Chapter 610, considered together, speak loudly and
clearly for the General Assembly that its intent in enacting the Sunshine Law
. .. was that all meetings of members of public governmental bodies ... at

which the peoples' business is considered must be open to the people and not
conducted in secrecy, and also that the records of the body and the votes of
its members must be open.
Id.; see also Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(stating, in dicta, that "[t]he clear purpose of the Sunshine Law is to open official conduct
to the scrutiny of the electorate").
50. See NEELY, supranote 39, at §§ 14.01-.03, 15.01; MO. REV. STAT. § 610.011
(2000).
51. MCCASKILL, supranote 43.
52. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.011.1 (2000). See generally SUNSHINE LAI,/, supranote
43.
53. NEELY, supranote 39, at § 14.03.
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4

Missouri

courts have been presented with ample opportunities to apply this construction
mandate, and they often have followed it.55 Furthermore, the policy provision
in Section 610.011.1 is shored up by the statutory presumption in Section
610.022.556 that "[p]ublic records shall be presumed to be open unless otherwise
exempt pursuant to the provisions of this chapter,"57 and by the stipulation in
Section 610.015 that "[a]ll public meetings shall be open to the public and public
votes and public records shall be open to the public for inspection and
duplication."5
Finally, Section 610.026, which governs the fees that
governmental bodies can charge for furnishing copies of public records, also
echoes the spirit of openness expressed in Section 610.011 by decreeing that
"[flees for copying public records shall not exceed the actual cost of document
search and duplication." 59

54. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.011.1 (2000). For exemptions provided in Missouri
Revised Statutes Section 610.021, see infra note 85. See generally SUNSHINE LAW,
supra note 43.
55. See State ex rel.Mo. Local Gov't Ret. Sys. v. Bill, 935 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996) (stating, in dicta, that "public records must be presumed open to public
inspection unless they contain information which clearly fits within one of the
exemptions set out in [Section] 610.021"); Pulitzer Publ'g Co. v. Mo. State Employees'
Ret. Sys., 927 S.W.2d 477,482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding, in part, that promotion of
the Sunshine Law's express public policy requires "that the law be liberally construed
and that the exceptions thereto be strictly construed"); State ex rel. Jackson County
Grand Jury v. Shinn, 835 S.W.2d 347,348-49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding, in part, that
exemptions to the Sunshine Law are to be strictly construed and are not to be extended
"beyond the express language used to declare when records are closed," and that courts
are "bound by the declared public policy of the legislature that records shall be open to
the public unless otherwise provided and any exception is to be strictly construed");
Librach v. Cooper, 778 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (stating, in dicta, that the
Sunshine Law addresses the inherent tension between the public's need for open
government and individuals' need for privacy by "exceptions [to disclosure] that are to
be narrowly construed"). But see Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 253, 261 (Mo.
1998) (finding that statutes allowing awards of attorney fees may be penal and, therefore,
must be strictly construed, and that the public policy of openness "relates only indirectly,
if at all, to the attomey[] fees penalty provided in [S]ection 610.027.3 ... [which]
requir[es] strict interpretation" due to its penal nature); Kan. City Star Co. v. Shields, 771
S.W.2d 101, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (stating, in dicta, that the fines provided for in
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 610.027.3 are penal in nature and, therefore, that
portion of the statute is to be strictly construed in spite of the court's recognition of the
Sunshine Law's express public policy and command that provisions, other than
exemptions, be liberally construed).
56. See NEELY, supranote 39, at § 15.03.
57. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.022.5 (2000).

58. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.015 (2000).
59. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.026.1(1) (2000).
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However, Chapter 610, which codified Missouri's Sunshine Law, "was not
the first comprehensive Missouri legislation on the subject of open records, and
today is not the only legislation of this nature." Enacted in 1961, and currently
in force, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 109.180 requires that "all state,
county and municipal records kept pursuant to statute or ordinance shall at all
reasonable times be open for a personal inspection by any citizen of Missouri,
and those in charge of the records shall not refuse the privilege to any citizen"
In addition to Section 109.180, Chapter 109 includes a number ofprovisions that
relate to the retention, maintenance, and disposal of state and local records'
Specifically, Section 109.210(5) defines the term "record" as it is used in
Chapter 109, by requiring that an item deemed a record must have been "made
or received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of official
business." Moreover, Sections 109.230 through 109.280 and Section 109.310
deal with the time frames for preserving records and the procedures by which
they may be destroyed."
Both the statutory open records provisions of Chapter 109 and Chapter
61065 apply to the records of state and local governmental entities.'
Nevertheless, Chapter 610 provides a wider gamut of remedies available to
private individuals, including: the judicial enforcement of the Sunshine Law,"
the voiding of governmental actions taken in violation of the Sunshine Law," a
fine limited to five-hundred dollars that may be levied against the governmental
entity or official who purposely violates the provisions of the Sunshine Law, and
payment "of all costs and reasonable attorney fees to any party successfully
establishing" such purposeful violation of the Sunshine Law. 0
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri stated,
in dicta, that "the legislature added to [Section] 610.027 the remedies of civil
fines and the voiding of legislation... to beef up and to deter violation of the.
..stated public policy of the law... to open the business of government to the
' However, courts have placed some bounds on the added remedy of
people."71
Subsection 3 fines.' In Spradlinv. City ofFulton2' a taxpayer sued for judicial

60. NEELY, supranote 39, at § 15.01.
61. Mo. REv. STAT. § 109.180 (2000); see NEELY, supra note 39, at § 15.01.
62. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 109.200-.310 (2000).
63. MO. REv.STAT. § 109.210(5) (2000).
64. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 109.230-.280, .310 (2000).
65. See Mo.REv. STAT. §§ 109.180, 610.010-.200 (2000).
66. See NEELY, supra note 39, at § 15.02.
67. See MO. REv. STAT. § 610.027.1 (2000).
68. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.027.1 (2000).
69. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.027A (2000).
70. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.027.3 (2000).
71. Kan. City Star Co. v. Shields, 771 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
72. See Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255, 261-62 (Mo. 1998) (finding
that statutes allowing awards of attorney fees may be penal and, therefore, must be
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enforcement of the open meetings provisions in Chapter 610 and sought an
award of attorney fees under Subsection 3.4 The Missouri Supreme Court noted
that "[t]he plain language of the statute only authorizes assessment of attorney[]
fees against an individual upon a demonstration of a 'purposeful' violation of the
law."75 Furthermore, the court stated that "in many situations, statutes allowing
for an award of attorney fees are 'penal in nature and must be strictly
construed."' 7 6 The court further declared that the public policy" explicit in
Missouri's Sunshine Law "relates only indirectly, if at all, to the attorney[] fees
penalty provided in [S]ection 610.027.3.'78
Nevertheless, the various remedies provided in Chapter 610 are not
exclusive.79 Rather, they are supplemental "to those provided by any other
provision of law."80 Offering far fewer remedies, Section 109.180 provides that
an official in violation "shall be subject to removal or impeachment and... shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."'" As a result of the broader range of
remedies available under Chapter 610, plaintiffs are likely to prefer to invoke
Chapter 610 when taking action based on a public records violation.
To do so, plaintiffs first must meet the definition of "public record" as set
forth in Section 610.010(6) as "any record, whether written or electronically
stored, retained by or of any public governmental body."82 "Retained," a key
term in that definition, has been interpreted by the Western District to have its
plain and ordinary meaning, which is "'to hold or continue to hold in possession
or use; continue to have ... ; maintain, in one's keeping."' 83 The Eastern
District established a similar meaning of "retain" by holding, in part, that to have

strictly construed, and holding, in pertinent part, that a purposeful violation of Missouri
Revised Statutes Section 610.027.3 must be shown to trigger such an award); Shields,
771 S.W.2d at 104; see also supranotes 9, 55.
73. 982 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. 1998).
74. Id. at 258.
75. Id. at 261.
76. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Thomas, 316 S.W.2d 571 (Ark.
1994); Lummus v. Shoney's of LaPlace, 713 So. 2d 1290 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Frisella
v. Reserve Life Ins. Co. of Dallas, 583 S.W.2d 728, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Hay v.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Lee McGuire 1900 Co.
v. Inventive Indus., 566 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)).
77. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.011 (2000).
78. Spradlin, 982 S.W.2d at 262.
79. See NEELY, supranote 39, at § 15.13.
80. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.027.1 (2000); see NEELY, supranote 39, at § 15.13.
81. Mo. REv. STAT. § 109.180 (2000); seeNEELY, supra note 39, at § 15.02.
82. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.010(6) (2000).
83. Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Allan, 787 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1938 (1981)).
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actual and "legal control over the [records in question is] to retain them for
purposes of the [Sunshine Law]."s
Giving further meaning to what constitutes a public record under the
Missouri Sunshine Law are the exemptions provided in Section 610.02l.s
These exemptions are to be given strict construction pursuant to Section
610.011.86

B. DeteninationRemedies andAttorney Fees
The Missouri Sunshine Law establishes a mechanism in Subsection 5
whereby a governmental entity that "is in doubt about the legality of closing a
particular meeting, record or vote may bring suit at the expense of that public
governmental body in the circuit court of the county of the public governmental
body's principal place of business to ascertain the propriety of any such
action."' Subsection 5 also allows governmental bodies to "seek a formal
opinion of the attorney general or an attorney for the governmental body. '
Very few states explicitly have established mechanisms in their open records
laws that specifically enable governmental entities to obtain legal guidance
proactively from an external decision maker, such as a court or the attorney
general, regarding the propriety of closing a record. 9
Subsection 5,which enables governmental entities to turn to the courts for
declaratory judgment on whether Chapter 610 allows closure of a given record,
sets forth that such a suit may be brought "at the expense of that public
governmental body." In interpreting this phrase, both the Western District and

84. Tipton v. Barton, 747 S.W.2d 325, 329 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
85. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.021 (2000). These exemptions include: real estate
transactions, employee personal information and individual personnel actions and files,
state militia or National Guard records, individualized nonjudicial mental or physical
health proceedings, scholastic records, testing and examination materials, individualized
welfare cases, public employee negotiations materials, softvare and related

documentation, competitive bidding specifications prior to approval or publication by the
public governmental body, sealed bids prior to opening and contract negotiations prior
to final action, individual personnel records of employees and applicants, except for "the
names, positions, salaries and lengths of service of officers and employees of public
agencies," "[r]ecords which are protected from disclosure by law," proprietary scientific
and technological innovations, "abuse and wrongdoing" hot line records, auditor work
product, and municipal electric utility financials and business plans related to
restructuring. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.021 (2000).
86. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.011 (2000).
87. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.027.5 (2000).
88. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.027.5 (2000).
89. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(6a) (2000); IOVA CODE ANN. § 22.8 (West
1995); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-619 (1999); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§

552.301-.307 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2000).
90. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.027.5 (2000).
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the Southern District have concluded that the statute purports to obligate the
governmental body to shoulder all suit-related expenses-including the
reasonable attorney fees of the record-requesting party." The courts reached
these congruent holdings by considering the underlying public policy toward
openness on one hand and the liberal construction mandate on the other.'
Being the first court to address the issue, the Western District found that the
phrase "at the expense of that public governmental body" in Subsection 5 was
ambiguous.' As a result, the court in State ex rel. MissouriLocal Government
Retirement System v. Bil194 consulted the canon of statutory construction against
surplusage9" and looked to the express policy of Missouri's Sunshine Law in
Section 610.011.1, which calls for the liberal construction of Sections "610.010
to 610.028" 96 in order to promote the policy of openness in government.' In so
doing, the court concluded that prior to the Sunshine Law's enactment,
governmental bodies were already obligated to pay their own litigation-related
expenses; thus, the provision must make the governmental body liable for the
record seeker's attorney fees.98 Based on this analysis, the court held that "[n]ot
requiring the public governmental body to bear [the record seeker's] expenses
would open a means for public governmental bodies to thwart the public policy
underlying the open meetings and records law."" Furthermore, the court noted
that to hold otherwise would enable a governmental entity "to 'test' the
determination of anyone requesting its records by filing a lawsuit, putting that

91. See City of Springfield v. Events Publ'g Co., 951 S.W.2d 366, 374 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997) (The court held, in pertinent part, "that the legislature meant that a public

governmental body should pay the attorney fees of its opponent when such body brings
a declaratory judgment [action] pursuant to [Section] 610.027.5" because the "Public
body would bear any burden of expense for the other two options under [Section]
610.027.5." The court cited State ex rel.Missouri Local Government Retirement System
v. Bill, 935 S.W.2d 659, 665-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996), which held, in pertinent part, that
interpreting the phrase "at the expense of the public governmental body" in Subsection
5 to mean something other than that the public body filing the suit must bear all of the
litigation expenses, including the respondent's attorney fees, would "thwart the public
policy underlying the open meetings and records law."). See also NEELY, supranote 39,
at § 15.13.
92. See supra note 91.
93. Bill, 935 S.W.2d at 665.
94. 935 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
95. Id. at 666. In applying the canon, the court stated that "[w]e should not
interpret statutes in a way which will render some of their phrases to be mere surplusage
.... [and] [w]e must presume that every word of a statute was included for a purpose and
has a meaning." Id. (citing Hadlock v. Dir. of Revenue, 860 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Mo.
1993)).

96. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.011.1 (2000).
97. Bill, 935 S.W.2d at 666.

98. Id.
99. Id.
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person in the dilemma of not defending
his or her request in court or enduring
°
the significant expense of doing so."''
Building on the Western District's holding in Bill regarding the assessment
of attorney fees under Subsection 5, the Southern District in City ofSpringfield
v. Events PublishingCo.10 1"note[d] that a public body would bear any burden
of expense for the two other options under [Section] 610.027.5."'02 The court
then held that because "the public governmental body chooses what avenue to
take under [Section] 610.027.5, and must bear the expenses of the other two
options, it follows that the public governmental body must bear all of the
expenses of an action for declaratory judgment."'0 3
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Hemeyer, the Missouri Supreme Court began by stating that "[a]U public
records shall be open to the public for inspection and duplication" based on the
provisions of Section 610.011.1 and Section 610.015."° The court then framed
the first issue as "whether the videotape is 'any record... retained by or of any
public governmental body.""' ° Noting that Chapter 610 provides no definition
for "retain," a key word in Chapter 610's "public record" definition,C' the court
gave the term its plain and ordinary meaning, which is "'to hold or continue to
hold in possession or use; continue to have, use, recognize, or accept; maintain
in one's keeping.""' 7 Furthermore, the court noted that "[t]he plain and ordinary
meaning of the word 'retain' does not specify a length of time for holding or
maintaining.' ' 0 8 As a result, the court found that the sheriff, a public
governmental body by the stipulation of the parties, "retained the tape of the
state representative's booking" because the sheriff kept booking tapes "for at
least four-and-a-half days" before they were reused."0
Next, the court explained "that the definition [of record] in [S]ection
109.210(5) is expressly limited to the 'State and Local Records Law,' [S]ections

100. Id.
101. 951 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
102. Id.
at 374. The other options provided in Subsection 5 are seeking an opinion
from the body's legal counsel or seeking an opinion from the attorney general. See Mo.
REv. STAT. § 610.027.5 (2000).
103. City of Springfield,951 S.W.2d at 374.
104. Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, 6 S.W.3d 880, 882 (Mo. 1999).
105. Id.
106. See supra text accompanying note 82.
107. Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 882 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICIONARY 1938 (1976)). This mirrors the approach taken by the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District of Missouri in MissouriProtection&Advocacy Ser ices
v. Allan, 787 S.W.2d 291,293 (1990). See supratext accompanying note 83.
108. Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 882.
109. Id.
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109.200 to 109.310."' ' The State and Local Records Law "determines the
period of time records are retained" by "authoriz[ing] the Secretary of State, the
Director of Records Management, State Records Commission, and Local
Records Board-upon recommendation by state and local agency heads-to
establish the length of time that records are kept.""' Moreover, the court
emphasized that records and nonrecord materials, alike, "require approval of the
[State Records] Commission or [Local Records] Board before they may be
destroyed" pursuant to Sections 109.260, 109.270, and 109.310.1 "
The court then turned its attention to Chapter 610, which governs access to
records pursuant to Sections 610.010(6) and 610.015."' The court noted that
these provisions were reinforced by Section 610.011.1, which expressly states
the public policy toward openness, and mandates liberal construction of Section
610.010 through Section 610.028 and strict construction of their exceptions." 4
Following these findings, the court held that, based on "the statutory mandate of
liberal construction," the videotape retained by the sheriff for four-and-a-half
days constituted a public record pursuant to Chapter 610."
After discounting issues brought up by the Missouri Attorney General as
amicus curiae on behalf of KRCG-TV ' 6 because they were not raised by the
parties in their pleadings, the court turned to the awarding of attorney fees
pursuant to Subsection 5.7 Finding that the sheriff initially brought the suit to
obtain a summary judgment on "the propriety of 'closing' the booking
videotape" by invoking Subsection 5, the court considered the lower courts'
interpretations of the phrase "'suit at the expense of that public governmental
body' contained in Subsection 5 in Bill and City of Springfield."8 The court
noted the Western District's reasoning that because "the public body was
obligated-before the statute's enactment-to bear its own expenses, the phrase
must refer to the other party's expenses."".9 To hold otherwise "would open a
means for public governmental bodies to thwart the public policy underlying the
[Sunshine] [L]aw" by enabling the body "to 'test' the determination of anyone
requesting its records by filing a lawsuit, [thereby] putting that person in the

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Id. "As amicus curiae, the attorney general argue[d] that the booking
videotape should be governed by the rules on 'investigative reports' in [S]ections

610.100 to 610.150." Id.
117. Id. at 882-83.
118. Id. at 883; see supra text accompanying notes 91-103.
119. Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, 6 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Mo. 1999) (citing State ex reL
Mo. Local Gov't Ret. Sys. v. Bill, 935 S.W.2d 659, 665-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)); see
supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
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dilemma of not defending his or her request in court or enduring the significant
expense of doing so." ' Furthermore, the court noted that such a result would
be absurd and would make a mockery of Section
610.026.1, which provides that
2
reasonable fees may be charged for records.1 '
Moving on to the Southern District's analysis of the phrase in Subsection
5 provided in City ofSpringfield,"'" the Hemeyer court remarked on how the
Southern District considered and built upon the Western District's decision in
Bill.'2 The Southern District did so by employing the liberal construction
mandate in Chapter 610 to "constru[e] 'suit at the expense of that public
governmental body' [as] mean[ing] that the public body must pay the attorney
fees of the party it sues under [S]ection 610.027].5.""2n
Finally, distinguishing the instant case from Spradlin,"U a case previously
decided by the court in which a taxpayer unsuccessfully sought an award of
attorney fees under Subsection 3 based on a purposeful violation of the Sunshine
Law, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the action in Hemeyer was
governed by Subsection 5.116 In so doing, the Missouri Supreme Court held that
the suit is "'at the expense of the public governmental body"' pursuant to
Subsection 5 and remanded the case "to the circuit court for an award of KRCGTV's expenses, including reasonable attorney fees."'2"
Judge Holstein concurred with the majority's decision with the exception
of the award of attorney fees pursuant to Subsection 5 2' Dissenting in this part
of the opinion, Judge Holstein, with whom Chief Justice Price and Judge
Limbaugh joined, noted that Subsection 5 must be "liberally construed to
promote the public policy that public records are to be open to the public,"
pursuant to Section 610.011.1.'" Judge Holstein then stated that the majority's
construction was too liberal in that it would bring about an absurd result that
would have required the sheriff to pay the television station's attorney fees even
if the sheriff had prevailed in the suit. 3 The dissent posited that such a result
would not promote access to public records.' Rather, it would "discourage
public governmental bodies from taking the initiative and going to court to
determine whether the information sought is indeed a public record where it has
120. Bill, 935 S.W.2d at 665-66.
121. See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 883.
122. City of Springfield v. Events Publ'g Co., 951 S.W.2d 366, 373-74 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997).

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 883.

Id.
See supratext accompanying notes 73-78.
See Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, 6 S.W.3d 880, 883-84 (Mo. 1999).
Id. at 884.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reasonable doubt" because "no right thinking governmental body will.., seek
judicial advice, knowing that it must pay for all the other parties' attorney
fees.' 32 To avoid incurring such expenses, the dissent asserted that, in the
future, when a public governmental body has doubt about the propriety of
disclosure, it will "let the party seeking the information33 go to court first"--a
result "wholly inconsistent with promoting disclosure."'
The dissent continued by noting that "parties are not entitled to an award of
attorney[] fees absent a contract, [a] statute allowing for the award or in rare
equitable situations,""13 ' and pointed to the fact that Subsection 5 does not13
expressly mention such an award but, rather, it contains the term "expense.,0
The dissent asserted that the plain meaning of "expense" was limited to barring
a governmental body from charging the record-requesting party "any fee for the
[body's] cost in bringing suit" and did not extend to the payment of the recordrequesting party's attorney fees.' 36 According to the dissent, this meaning can
be clarified when Subsection 5 is read in tandem with Section 610.026.1, which
limits fees charged by governmental bodies to those "'reasonable ...for
providing access to' public records."' 37 Furthermore, the dissent stated that "the
General Assembly has demonstrated that it knows how to provide for the award
of attorney[] fees in 'open records' cases by making specific provision therefore
in another subsection of the same statute"--referring to Subsection 3.38
Therefore, the dissent concluded that "it is contrary to both the canons of
construction and sound reason to say that the legislature had a secret intent to
award such fees in other circumstances" and that the majority's opinion will lead
to results that are inconsistent with the promotion of disclosure.'39
V. COMMENT
In Hemeyer, the Missouri Supreme Court narrowly distinguished the case
at bar from its prior decision in Spradlin40 by parsing the Sunshine Law's
remedial provision, Section 610.027.'' By its action, the court preserved the
fundamental public policy of open government expressed prominently in Section

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.

Id. at 885.
Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
141. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.027 (2000).
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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610.011.1142 and echoed throughout the Sunshine Law,'" as well as in other

record-related statutes that were in effect at the time of the decision."
First, the majority in Hemeyer was correct in distinguishing the instant case
from Spradlin,the case in which a concerned citizen brought suit to enforce the
open meetings components of the Sunshine Law and requested attorney fees
under Subsection 3V45 The moving parties in Hem eyer and Spradlin invoked the
Sunshine Law's remedial provision.'" However, Subsection 3 invoked by
Spradlin, the Fulton taxpayer, is designed specifically for "[a]ny aggrieved
person, taxpayer to, or citizen ot this state, or the attorney general orprosecuting
attorney."' 4 Subsection 5 invoked by Sheriff Hemeyer, however, is the only
subsection of the remedial provision designated for use by the public
governmental bodies governed by the Sunshine Law.'"
Yet another distinction between the cases is that Missouri courts, including
4
the Missouri Supreme Court, have held that Subsection 3 was penal in nature,' '
whereas no such finding has been made with regard to Subsection 5. In
Spradlin,the Missouri Supreme Court stated that "in many situations, statutes
allowing for an award of attorneyl] fees are 'penal in nature and must be strictly
construed."" 5 Furthermore, the court noted that "the policy (that favors

142. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.011.1 (2000).

143. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 610.015, .022.5, .026 (2000); supra text
accompanying notes 56-59.
144. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 32.091 (Supp. 1997), repealedby H.B. No. 1797,90th
Gen. Assem. (Mo. 2000); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 109.180, 374.070 (2000); supra text
accompanying notes 61, 81.
145. See Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255,258 (Mo. 1998).
146. See Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, 6 S.W.3d 880, 881 (Mo. 1999); Spradlin, 982
S.W.2d. at 258.
147. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.027.1 (2000).
148. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.027 (2000).

149. See Spradlin, 982 S.V.2d at 261; Kan. City Star Co. v. Shields, 771 S.W.2d
101, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); supranote 55.
150. Spradlin, 982 S.W.2d at 261 (quoting Frisella v. Reserve Life Ins. Co. of
Dallas, 583 S.W.2d 728, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Hay v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 551
S.W.2d 954,957 (Mo. Ct App. 1977)) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Thomas, 316
S.W.2d 571 (Ark. 1994); Lummus v. Shoney's of LaPlace, 713 So. 2d 1290 (La. Ct.
App. 1998); Lee McGuire 1900 Co. v. Inventive Indus., 566 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978)). The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri found in
Shields that "[a] statute, which is penal in nature, must be strictly construed" and that
statutes that impose a fine are penal. Shields, 771 S.W.2d at 104. Moreover, the Shields
court found that "[w]here a fine for violation of a statute is paid into the registry of the
ourt ... the fine is to be considered both as a punishment to the wrongdoer and a

deterrent to others." Id. Based on these findings, the Shields court held, in part, that
"Section 610.027.3 is penal because it imposes a fine" and, therefore, must be strictly
construed, whereas "[t]he other portions of the statute... are to be liberally construed."
Id.
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openness] relates only indirectly, if at all, to the attorney[] fees penalty provided
in [S]ection 610.027.3 ...[and] the contrary policy requiring strict interpretation
of penal statutes controls.... However, the court limited its strict interpretation
to Subsection 3 rather than applying it to the entirety of the Sunshine Law's
remedial provision.'52 In so doing, the court noted that its limitation of
Subsection 3 does not take the bite out of the other remedies provided by the
Sunshine Law. 53 The Hemeyer decision not only distinguishes between the two
subsections, but it also places boundaries on the "strict interpretation" language
used in Spradlin regarding Subsection 3,"s which provides for the imposition of
civil fines upon purposeful violation of the Sunshine Law. 5 5 This limitation of
Spradlin is appropriate as the public policy statement regarding openness in
Section 610.011.1 specifically mandates that "Sections 610.010 to 610.028 shall
be liberally construed ...
to promote this public policy."' 156 As Subsection 5 falls
within the range of sections to be liberally construed, limitation of Subsection 5
would be inappropriate.
Moreover, the majority's decision in Hemeyerneither eviscerates the public
policy underlying the Sunshine Law" nor completely eliminates the likelihood
of a public governmental body's proactive initiation of a suit to obtain summary
judgment on closing a record,'s5 as the dissent suggests. 159 Instead, it strengthens
the policy of openness in government by refusing to allow a public governmental
body from financially bullying less resourceful and committed record seekers
into forgoing their right of access to public meetings and records. This is
achieved by making the outcome of the governmental entity's suit irrelevant and
by causing the governmental body that initiates a suit pursuant to Subsection 5

151.
152.
153.
154.

Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255, 262 (Mo. 1998).
Id.
Id.
In distinguishing between Spradlin and the instant case, the majority pointed

out that:

Here, the public governmental body sued to determine whether it should
disclose the videotape. Thus, this suit is governed by [S]ection 610.027.5,
and is "at the expense of the public governmental body." In Spradlin, a
taxpayer sued. Suits for "judicial enforcement" of [C]hapter 610 are
governed by the first four [S]ubsections of 610.027. Therefore, in Spradlin,
the awarding of attorney fees was governed by [S]ection 610.027.3. Spradlin
does not control the award of attorney fees under [S]ection 610.027.5.
Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, 6 S.W.3d 880, 883-84 (Mo. 1999) (citations omitted).
155. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.027.3 (2000).
156. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.011.1 (2000).
157. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.011.1 (2000).
158. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.027.5 (2000).
159. See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 884-85.
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to assume responsibility for all suit-related expenses. These suit-related
expenses include the reasonable attorney fees of the record seeker."
Furthermore, it bears noting that Subsection 5 provides multiple proactive
options for public governmental bodies that are "in doubt about the legality of
closing a particular meeting, record or vote.""" These options include
"bring[ing] suit at the expense of that public governmental body" and "seek[ing]
a formal opinion of the attorney general or an attorney for the governmental
body."' 162 In addition, the governmental body can elect to do nothing, deny
access, and wait until the record seeker files an enforcement suit, as the dissent
noted."
The governmental body has the freedom to choose among these
options-all of which have a price tag. Some options may be more palatable
than others given the situation in question. Many variables are likely to play into
the body's decision, including the expected total cost of the action, precedential
value, timeliness of the decision, and the impact of negative publicity associated
with being accused of or, worse, found guilty of violating the Sunshine Law.
Moreover, the Missouri Supreme Court has noted that "[a]bsent a contrary
showing, there is a presumption of regularity of agency action. ' ' If this
presumption is to be given full effect, then governmental entities should be given
the benefit of the doubt that they operate in a manner that is in the best interest
of the public. As a result, it is somewhat rash to posit, as the dissent did in
Hemeyer,'" that a governmental entity will never choose the option of bringing
suit under Subsection 5, even if the entity will be required to pay the legal fees
of the record-seeking party.
By placing the financial responsibility on a governmental body that
exercises its right to bring suit under Subsection 5, the Hem eyer decision bolsters
the axiomatic public policy of openness in government declared in Section
610.011.1. This tenet is restated throughout the Sunshine Law. For instance,
Section 610.015 governs the recording of votes and reiterates that "[a]ll public
meetings shall be open to the public and public votes and public records shall be

160. Id. at 883; see supratext accompanying notes 119-24.
161. Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, 6 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Mo. 1999).
162. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.027.5 (2000).
163. See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 884 (stating that"if that governmental entity waits
and lets the party seeking the information file suit first, that governmental body vill only
pay the other side's attorney fees if it is found to have purposefully violated [Sections]
610.010 to 610.020").
164. See generally Eric Stem, Sunshine Lmv May Be Routinely Violated, Officials
Say Bill Would PutMore Bite Into MissouriStatute,ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, Apr. 10,
2000, at BI (quoting Larry Markenson of the Missouri Municipal League as stating:
"The real penalty is public humiliation and embarrassment" and "[w]ho wants to be
found guilty of violating the open meetings laws?").
165. State v. Thompson, 627 S.V.2d 298, 301 (Mo. 1982).
166. See Hemeyer, 6 S.W.3d at 885.
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open to the public for inspection and duplication."' 67 Furthermore, Section
610.022 establishes limitations on and procedures for closing meetings,16 and
repeats that "[p]ublic records shall be presumed to be open unless otherwise
exempt pursuant to the provisions of this chapter."' 69 Even beyond the strictures
of the Sunshine Law, the policy of openness in government surfaces in other
Missouri record-related statutes that were in effect at the time of the Hemeyer
decision. 7 For example, Section 109.180 mandates that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law, all state, county and municipal records kept pursuant to statute
or ordinance shall at all reasonable times be open for a personal inspection by
any citizen of Missouri, and those in charge of the records shall not refuse the
privilege to any citizen."' 7 ' Section 374.070 directs the handling of documents
by the Department of Insurance and commands that "[t]he office shall be a
public office and the records shall be public records and shall at all times be open
to the inspection of the public."'7 Finally, Section 32.091 controlled the
disclosure of motor vehicle records and recapitulated that "[ilt is the public
policy of this state that records be open to the public unless otherwise provided
by law" and that "disclosure provisions.., shall be liberally construed and the
exemptions strictly construed to promote this public policy."'7 In light of the
notions of openness and access that underlie these record-related Missouri
statutes, the Hemeyer decision harmonizes with the fundamental underpinning
of democratic government held by Missourians and recognized by the General
Assembly. This can be best summarized as "[a]n open
74 society needs open
institutions making open decisions openly arrived at."'
Finally, the Hemeyer decision, which makes public governmental bodies
that bring an action under Subsection 5 liable for the record-seeker's attorney
fees pursuant to the language of the provision, comes at a critical time.'
According to the 1999 Audit of Compliance with Sunshine Law Requirements,
State Auditor Claire McCaskill concluded that "[a]n estimated 1,649 of 3,459
(47.6%) political subdivisions would not respond properly to requests for
information under provisions of the Sunshine Law.' 76 In light of this audit, any

167. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.015 (2000); see supratext accompanying note 58.
168. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.022 (2000).
169. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.022.5 (2000); see supratext accompanying note 57.
170. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 32.091 (Supp. 1997), repealedby H.B. No. 1797, 90th
Gen. Assem. (Mo. 2000); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 109.180, 374.070 (2000).
171. Mo. REV. STAT. § 109.180 (2000); see supra text accompanying notes 61, 81.
172. Mo. REv. STAT. § 374.070 (2000).
173. Mo. REV. STAT. § 32.091, .091.5 (Supp. 1997), repealedby H.B. No. 1797,
90th Gen. Assem. (Mo. 2000).
174. Librach v. Cooper, 778 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
175. See MCCASKILL, supra note 43; Stem, supranote 164, at B1.
176. MCCASKILL, supra note 43. The audit was conducted due to "recent citizen
concerns and lawsuits over access to public records." MCCASKILL, supra note 43.
Variance from the Sunshine Law included lack of response, denials, and late responses.
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legal action that puts teeth in Missouri's Sunshine Law in order to buoy its
public policy, whether undertaken by a court or the legislature, is much needed,
and the Hemeyer decision is one step in that direction. As a result of decisions
such as Hemeyer, state and local governmental entities may become more aware
of, educated about, and compliant with Missouri's Sunshine Law.
VI. CONCLUSION

In Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted the
phrase "at the expense of that public governmental body" in Subsection 5 of the
Sunshine Law's remedial provision to mean that the public governmental body
initiating a suit for summary judgment on closure of a record under Missouri's
Sunshine Law is liable for the attorney fees of the record seeker. By reaching
this result, the court upheld the public policy of openness in government that
buttresses the Sunshine Law, as well as other Missouri record-related statutes.
While imposing costs on governmental entities, which ultimately must be paid
from tax coffers, the financial costs imposed by the court's decision in Hemeyer
are slight when compared to the costs of compromising a fundamental tenet of
democratic government-the concept of open government.
MICHELE L. MEKEL

The results were based on "a random statistical sample of 214 political subdivisions"
statewide. MCCASKiLL, supranote 43. The selected sample of 214 entities were "sent
a request for the minutes of their last board meeting held in the calendar year 1998"'
MCCASKLL,

supra note 43.
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